ABSTRACT
Malicious software is rampant on the Internet and costs billions of dollars
each year. Safe and thorough analysis of malware is key to protecting vul-
nerable systems and cleaning those that have already been infected. Most
current state-of-the-art analysis platforms run alongside the malware, in-
creasing their detectability. This reduces the value of analysis because some
malware is known to behave differently when being analyzed. Virtualiza-
tion offers a compelling platform for malware analysis, with strong isolation
and the ability to save and restore guest state. Commodity virtual machine
monitors (VMMs), however, are not designed for malware analysis. Due to
their complexity, they often fail to provide transparency and even expose
vulnerabilities which could be exploited by the malware running inside guest
system.
We design and implement a lightweight VMM (namely MAVMM) that
is created specially for one job: malware analysis. MAVMM does not im-
plement unnecessary virtualization features commonly found in general pur-
pose hypervisors, including virtual device emulation. We take advantage of
hardware virtualization support to make MAVMM more simple, secure and
transparent. In this thesis, we describe the design and implementation of
MAVMM, and the features that we can extract from programs running in-
side the guest OS. We evaluate our platform in three aspects: functionality,
detectability and performance. We show that our system can extract useful
information from malicious software, and that it is not susceptible to known
virtualization detection techniques.
ii
Comentarios a estos manuales